![]() Like nearly everything else in politics these days, discussions of the war in Ukraine often devolve into nasty rounds of name-calling.This place is shrouded in mystery. ![]() If you say you are worried about escalation, aren’t convinced that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ultimate goal is to restore the old Soviet empire, and voice concerns that the war is a costly and potentially dangerous distraction from other foreign-policy priorities, then you’ll probably be accused of being an appeaser, an apologist for Moscow, or something even worse. This level of vituperation is not conducive to a serious discussion of alternative perspectives and policy options at a time when uncertainty is rife and weighing the costs and benefits of different courses of action carefully is critical.īy contrast, if you favor open-ended Western support for Ukraine, dismiss the possibility of escalation, and believe the war must continue until Russia suffers a decisive defeat and Putin is ousted, your critics will denounce you as a warmonger whose disregard for costs and risks could get us all vaporized. Humility, empathy, and attention to logic and evidence should be the world’s guiding principles, but these traits are hard to sustain when war is raging, people are dying, and passions are inflamed. If we step back a bit, however, the debate on Ukraine can be seen as an illustration of a long-standing divide in foreign-policy circles. This divide was evident in debates on Vietnam in the 1960s and over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. These competing worldviews are also fundamental to the policy differences between advocates of energetic U.S. interventionism and those who favor greater foreign-policy restraint. Those who favor open-ended support for Ukraine see the world as highly interconnected and sensitive to small changes. In this view, international order is a fragile thing-like a financial market where a bit of bad news can spark panic and trigger a total market meltdown. For those who think this way, even minor setbacks can destroy a great power’s reputation, lead its allies to switch sides and bandwagon with an opponent, embolden revisionist powers, and produce rapid and far-reaching changes in the international order.īy the same logic, advocates of this view also tend to believe that even modest victories can produce big benefits in other areas and issues. If the United States comes out on top in some international dispute, allies around the world will supposedly be reassured, potential aggressors will be deterred for years, and the existing order will be reinforced. If the United States loses or even compromises, however, look out.įrom this perspective, if Russia gets anything out of the war, then Putin’s appetite will grow ever larger, and he is likely to think he can keep blackmailing the West into giving him whatever he wants. The United States and NATO will lose credibility, wars of conquest will once again be seen as legitimate tools of statecraft, China will decide it can take Taiwan whenever it wants, any semblance of a “rules-based order” will collapse, and woe will be us. ![]() But if Russia is soundly defeated and Putin is retired (to put it politely) , then revisionists around the world will learn once again that aggression does not pay. Ukrainian democracy will flourish, liberalism will get a new lease on life around the world, China will stand down over Taiwan, inflation will subside, and happy days will be here again. One can understand why the Ukrainian government and its most fervent supporters in the West tend to purvey this view. If compromise would lead to all these horrible outcomes and victory would bring such tremendous benefits, then giving Ukraine whatever it needs to achieve its war aims seems like the obvious thing to do. This is the classic formula for starting or continuing a war: You try to convince people that doing more will bring great benefits at a reasonable cost and that failing to do so will lead to disaster. Given that, in this case, we are dealing with a nuclear-armed adversary, those who embrace this view also tend to argue that Putin’s nuclear threats are signs of desperation and warn against succumbing to nuclear blackmail.
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